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BOOK REVIEW
IS THAT ALL?  A REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, AN AGENDA
FOR THE FUTURE, BY LYNTON KEITH
CALDWELL
OLIVER A. HOUCK*
The National Environmental Policy Act1  (NEPA) holds the un-
usual honor of being the most successful environmental law in the
world and the most disappointing.  Passed in the waning moments of
1969, within a few short years NEPA would take over the federal es-
tablishment like a new language, spawn “little NEPAs” in nearly half
of the states,2 spread to Europe, Latin America, and the Far East at
the speed of fast food outlets,3 and become a bedrock principle of in-
ternational environmental law.4
* Professor of Law and Director of the Tulane Environmental Law Program, Tulane
University, New Orleans, Louisiana.  Professor Houck has also served as Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney in Washington, D.C; General Counsel and Vice-President of the National Wildlife Federa-
tion; on the Board of Directors of the Defenders of Wildlife and the Environmental Law Insti-
tute; and on the Litigation Review Board of the Environmental Defense Fund.  Please direct
questions or comments to ohouck@tulane.edu.  This book review is also available at
<http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/ 10DELPFHouck>.
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994).
2. As of 1990, 19 states, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
had enacted “little NEPAs” by statute or by executive order. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 41
(1991) [hereinafter CEQ, 20TH ANNUAL REPORT].  Moreover, New York City and a number of
other local governments and municipalities had also enacted "little NEPAs." See id. at 42.  Fur-
ther, several additional states had adopted NEPA-like processes through case law. See id.; see
also Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl Control Comm’n, 452 So.2d 1152 (La. 1984) (inter-
preting Louisiana Constitution to require discussion and disclosure of impacts and alternatives
to state actions).
3. For a summary of the expansion of NEPA to other countries, see CEQ, 20TH ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 2, at 43-44.  For more contemporary discussions, see generally Nicholas A.
Robinson, International Trends in Environmental Impact Assessment, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 591 (1992);  Clive Bruffet, Monitoring the Effectiveness of Environmental Impact Assess-
ment in Southeast Asia, 4 ASIAN J. ENVTL. MGMT. 53 (1996) (describing Asian environmental
impact assessment systems); 2 HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN
PRACTICE: IMPACT AND LIMITATIONS (Judith Petts ed., 1999) (evaluation of European and
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Yet, at bottom, the law is hard to find.  Parsing its language,
phrase by opaque phrase, we arrive at a requirement that federal
agencies, with all of their inherent biases and under the constant push
of their particular economic constituencies—road contractors, land
developers, oil and gas producers, shippers, and timber companies—
must review the environmental impacts of their own actions before
acting, i.e., they must generate an environmental impact statement.5
It hardly sounds like a barn-burner.
Every semester, in law schools around the United States, a new
crop of students not yet familiar with NEPA but eager to plunge into
environmental law and save the world, plunge instead into this short,
cryptic, largely-aspirational statute and go into shock.  Is that all?
Thirty years after the enactment of NEPA, “is that all?” remains its
most haunting question.  It is the root question of Lynton Caldwell’s
recent book, The National Environmental Policy Act, An Agenda for
the Future.
The world owes a large debt of gratitude to Lynton Caldwell.  It
was his essay in the mid-1960s that, at the time when this country was
becoming uncomfortably aware that things were very wrong with the
environment, urged the need for a new national policy of environ-
mental protection.6  It was his collaboration with Senator Henry Jack-
son, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs, that led to NEPA’s now-famous “action forcing” requirement:
Dr. CALDWELL. I have already suggested, it seems to me, that
the Congress indeed has a responsibility and could enunciate [a na-
tional environmental] policy.  But beyond this, I would urge that in
the shaping of such a policy, it have an action-forcing, operational
aspect.  When we speak of policy we ought to think of a statement
which is so written that it is capable of implementation; that it is not
merely a statement of things hoped for, it is a statement which will
Latin American systems).
4. See RESTATEMENT (3D) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§601 cmt. e (“[A] state has an obligation to consult with another state if a proposed activity
within its jurisdiction and control poses a substantial risk to the environment of the other state .
. . .”), reprinted in WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND REFERENCES 200 (1992); U.N. Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5Rev. 1
Princ. 4 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) (adopting a “precautionary principle” that na-
tions look ahead to anticipate and prevent environmental harm).  For a discussion of the incor-
poration of NEPA into the decision-making process of international organizations, see CEQ,
20TH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 44-6.
5. See  42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c).
6. See Lynton  K. Caldwell, Environment: A New Focus for Public Policy, 23 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 138 (1963).
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compel or reinforce or assist . . . the executive agencies in particu-
lar, but going beyond this, the Nation as a whole, to take the kind
of action which will protect and reinforce what I have called the life
support system of this country.
The CHAIRMAN  [SENATOR JACKSON].  I would like to pur-
sue this policy matter for a moment.  I agree with you that realisti-
cally what is needed is restructuring the governmental side of this
problem is to legislatively create those situations that will bring
about an action-forcing procedure the departments must comply
with.  Otherwise, these lofty declarations are nothing more than
that.  It is merely a finding and statement but there is no require-
ment as to implementation.  I believe this is what you were getting
at.
Dr. CALDWELL.  Yes, exactly so.
The CHAIRMAN.  I am wondering if we might not broaden the
policy provision in the bill so as to lay down a general requirement
that would be applicable to all agencies that have responsibilities
that affect the environment rather than trying to go through agency
by agency.
I think the immediate example that comes to my mind and has to
yours already by the statement is that the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, in granting permits or licenses in connection with nuclear
power-plants, should be required to make an environmental find-
ing.
This, of course, might be applicable to the Federal Power Commis-
sion.  One can go on down the list of agencies . . . .7
An “environmental finding.”  There are few occasions in life
when one can see the very beginning of a huge idea, and this is one of
them.  Nonetheless, Dr. Caldwell has gone on to ride NEPA like a
parent, criticizing its shortcomings in a series of articles that began at
7. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969:  Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237 and S. 1752
Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong.  116 (1969) [hereinafter
Hearings].  It is interesting to learn, from Dr. Caldwell’s current book, that this conversation
was something of a set-piece, staged in advance with Senator Jackson and Committee Council
William Van Ness. See LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT, AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 63 (1998).  If debts of gratitude are in order, Mr. Van Ness
also needs to be recognized both for his work on NEPA and for his management and drafting of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. See generally HARVEY LIEBER,
FEDERALISM AND CLEAN WATERS (1975).  The Federal Water Pollution Act is one of the most
successful environmental laws ever enacted, propelled forward even today by its own “acting-
forcing” mechanisms.  See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §
1251(a) (1994).  See also Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants under the Clear
Water Act, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,528 (1991) (describing the Act’s multiple implementation
schemes).
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least ten years ago and that culminate in his new book.8  Thirty years
out, he is not content.
In his current book, Dr. Caldwell perceives a statute that has
been taken over by lawyers, that has had marginal effect on federal
agency programs, and that has simply failed to integrate environ-
mental considerations into the mainstream of the major decision-
making of this country, and now, the world.  He sees the authority
and aspirations of his statute swallowed up by an undue focus on im-
pact statement preparation, to the exclusion of NEPA’s other provi-
sions.  He sees the “substantive” requirements of NEPA that exhort
environmentally sound decision-making fall by the wayside, ignored
by federal agencies and unenforced by the courts.  He sees unattained
or not-even-attempted potential in the President’s Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality and other mechanisms to elevate environmental
concerns and to leverage these concerns to the forefront.  Like many
a father, Dr. Caldwell sees the shortcomings, the failure to reach all
that was wished for in this child.  And like many a father, he wished
for too much.
Dr. Caldwell is not alone in his disappointment with NEPA.  To
its critics, the statute is an elaborate catechism requiring years of de-
lay and paperwork—often irrelevant, always self-promoting, and at
times outright deceitful in its consideration of environmental ef-
fects—before getting on with the job.9  To its supporters, NEPA has
worked miracles in changing government behavior, infused agencies
with environmental specialists, brought in the views of other agencies
and an often-skeptical public, surfaced alternative courses of action,
and produced thousands of better decisions—harm-avoiding and
harm-mitigating decisions—on the ground.10  Both camps are, of
course, correct, and there is little to be gained in trying to conclude
8. See, e.g., Lynton Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act, 22 HARV. ENTL. L. REV. 203 (1998); Lynton Caldwell, NEPA Revisited:
A Call for Constitutional Amendment, ENVTL. F.,  Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 18, 20.
9. See  WILLIAM ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 811 (2d ed. 1994).  For one (of many)
hearings airing these and similar complaints from industry and development interests, see Im-
plementation of the National Environmental Policy Act by the Council on Environment Quality,
1982: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Toxic Substances and Environmental Oversight of the
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong. 8-11 (1982) (statement of Daniel
W. Cannon, Director of Environmental Affairs, National Association of Manufacturers).
10. See ROGERS, supra note 9, at 811; J. Clarence Davies, Some Thoughts on Implementing
Integration, 22 ENVTL. L. 139, 145 (1991); Dinah Bear, NEPA at 19: A Primer on an “Old” Law
with Solutions to New Problems, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,060, 10,062 (1989).  See also COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS
EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS (1977).
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which is more correct.  Nearly everyone sees the donut.  Nearly eve-
ryone sees the hole.
The real problem with NEPA is that it attempts the impossible.
Against a horizon of injuries—such as cities shut down by toxic smog,
rivers so polluted they caught fire, and federally aided highways lay-
ing waste to inner cities, increasingly toxic pesticides and the predic-
tions of a Silent Spring, a catalogue of horrors impressive both in
their urgency and their diversity11—Congress looked for a silver bul-
let, the one solution for all federal actions12 that would do nothing less
than change the conduct of the entire government.
At the start of a law class on NEPA, I often present my students
with the vision held by Congress and ask them to develop their own
statute.  They soon propose a Super Environmental Agency, an envi-
ronmental czar, to rule on activities that affect the environment...but
on every new highway, airport, post office, mineral deposit, nuclear
plant, transmission line, dredged canal, industrial source permit, fish-
ery quota, timber sale, and range allotment in the country?  What ex-
pertise would such an agency need in transportation, navigation, and
resource management?  And with all of that expertise, would we now
be inventing a second government?  Who would appoint such an
agency and how would it be insulated from the same economic and
political pressures that now drive the Department of Transportation,
the U.S. Forest Service, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers?  In-
stead, are we better off trying to “green” the existing agencies, and if
so, exactly how do we do that?
In theory, all of these questions have answers.  However, the
problem is that they have several different answers, some of which
11. The Senate Report underlying NEPA  begins with the following apocalyptic vision:
The inadequacy of present knowledge, policies, and institutions is reflected in our
Nation’s history, in our national attitudes, and in our contemporary life.  We see in-
creasing evidence of this inadequacy all around us: haphazard urban and suburban
growth; crowding, congestion, and conditions within our central cities which result in
civil unrest and detract from man’s social and psychological well-being; the loss of
valuable open spaces; inconsistent and, often, incoherent rural and urban land-use
policies; critical air and water pollution problems; diminishing recreational opportu-
nity; continuing soil erosion; the degradation of unique ecosystems; needless defores-
tation; the decline and extinction of fish and wildlife species; faltering and poorly de-
signed transportation systems; poor architectural design and ugliness in public and
private structures; rising levels of noise; the continued proliferation of pesticides and
chemicals without adequate consideration of the consequences; radiation hazards;
thermal pollution; an increasingly ugly landscape cluttered with billboards, powerli-
nes, and junkyards; and many, many other environmental quality problems . . . .
S. Rep. No. 91-296, at 1 (1969).
12.  See Hearings, supra note 7, at 116 (statement of the Chairman) (“I am wondering if we
might not broaden the policy provision in the bill so as to lay down a general requirement that
would be applicable to all agencies.”) (emphasis added).
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work no better and others of which are not feasible in an American
scheme of government (although some of them, such as the environ-
mental czar, are appearing in the programs of other countries).13  In
light of these difficulties, the solution Congress arrived at in 1969 be-
gins to look a little better.  If Congress wanted to affect this great
range of federal activity and impacts, it was going to have to come up
with general substantive principles and then procedural mechanisms
with which to apply them.  The principles are those of section
101(b).14  The mechanisms are in section 102.15  The hard parts are the
13. See generally Felipe Paez, Environmental Framework Laws in Latin America, 13 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 625, 648 (1996) (describing the role of Mexico’s national environmental
agency); Greg M. Block, One Step Away from Environmental Citizen Suits in Mexico, 23
ENVTL. L. REP. 10347 (1993) (describing the Mexican ruling administration’s authority to reject
participation in statutory enforcement by environmental groups); Article 40, Regulation of the
Chilean Environmental Impact Assessments System, Decree No. 30, Minister-Secretary Gen-
eral of Government (empowering a Chilean authority to reject environmental impact state-
ments).
14. Which provides:
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing re-
sponsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with
other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal
plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may—
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and cultur-
ally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degrada-
tion, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage,
and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and vari-
ety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high
standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attain-
able recycling of depletable resources.
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1994).
15. Which provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the poli-
cies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and ad-
ministered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agen-
cies of the Federal Government shall—
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated
use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning
and in decision-making which may have an impact on man’s environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council
on Environmental Quality established by subchapter II of this chapter, which will in-
sure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given
appropriate consideration in decision-making along with economic and technical
considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—
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principles.  They are inspiring, but they are not law.  Almost by defi-
nition, they cannot be law.
The critical element of any law is precision.  It is the line between
that which may be done and may not be done.16  A declaration that
highways shall not go through public parks, such as that in section 303
of the Department of Transportation Act, is law.17  One can inde-
pendently and objectively look at a proposed road, see where it goes,
and determine whether or not it complies.  On the other hand, a dec-
laration that federal agencies shall “attain the widest range of benefi-
cial uses of the environment,” such as that in NEPA section
101(b)(3), is not law. 18  Such a statement could support, alternatively,
damming the Colorado River (to provide electricity for Los Angeles),
leaving it alone (for the benefit of tourists and rafters), or for that
matter—as has been urged—removing the existing Glen Canyon
Dam.19  So it is with nearly all of the NEPA policies of section
101(b).20  Motivational as they may be, they lack the precision that
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult
with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or
special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.  Copies of such
statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State and local
agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards,
shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and
to the public as provided by section 552 of title 5, and shall accompany the proposal
through the existing agency review processes.
Id. § 4332.
16. In administrative law, this ingredient of specificity is called “law to apply” and deter-
mines the reviewability (i.e., the enforceability) of a particular statute or regulation. See Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410-13 (1971).
17. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1994) (protecting public areas absent a showing of no feasible pru-
dent alternatives).  For a discussion of this provision and its requirements, see Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411-13.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3).
19. See EDWARD ABBEY, THE MONKEY WRENCH GANG  (1975).  This proposal to re-
move the dam has now picked up momentum from the Sierra Club and other environmental
organizations. See generally Ed Marston, Sierra Club Moves to Fortify Its ‘Drain Lake Powell’
Campaign, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Oct. 13, 1997.
20. The phrase “nearly all" is used, because a notable exception may be contained in sec-
tion 101(b)(6), providing that the government “approach the maximum attainable recycling of
depletable resources.”  That provision might supply direct grounds for enforcement against
practices that ignored, or even penalized, recycling.  This issue was the crux of the complaint in
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would allow someone in our system, ultimately a reviewing court, to
say, “this is over the line.”
Several courts have tried to find law in these provisions.  In one
particularly inviting case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
struck down a decision by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development creating a ghetto of low-income housing across mid-
town Manhattan,21 only to have the Supreme Court reverse,22 stating
that once NEPA’s procedural impact statement requirement was met,
“NEPA requires no more.”23  As dubious and clearly insensitive to
people and their environment as the housing decision was in this case
(and as the Court’s curt, per curiam opinion was), one can appreciate
the Court’s practical predicament:  by what standard is a federal court
to determine whether or not an action “fulfills the responsibilities of
each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding genera-
tions,” as stated in NEPA section 101(b)(1) or any of the ensuing sub-
stantive provisions?24
U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), bet-
ter known for its resolution of the issue of the standing of plaintiffs to sue.
21. See Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1978).
22. See Stryker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlan, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
23. See id. at 228.
24. The question of whether the principles of section 101(b) were “substantive law”—i.e.,
provided a legal standard against which government conduct could be judicially reviewed and, if
necessary, reversed—had been left open for more than a decade.  In his thesis on NEPA in Cal-
vert Cliffs, Judge Wright suggested this tantalizing possibility, stating:
The reviewing court probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on its merits, un-
der Section 101, unless it be shown that the actual balance of costs and benefits that
was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values.
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v.United States Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Reviewing courts, even the Supreme Court, kept this flame alive, in dicta, throughout
the 1970s. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)
(stating that “NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate
to the agencies is essentially procedural” and, since “essentially” does not mean “totally,” im-
plying that substantive review remained alive).  With Strykers Bay, however, the Court slammed
the door on substantive review, as it has so remained. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).  Had an agency decision so egregious as that in Strykers Bay
come along in the early 1970s, it is possible that the Court would have decided differently or at
least given the issue the decency of a signed opinion.  In fact, this author has argued in favor of
substantive review, as early as 1972, in an amicus brief advocating substantive review on the
Gilham dam case. See Amicus Brief for the National Wildlife Federation, Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’r, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972) .  The plaintiff’s counsel adopted
the argument in the first of several law review articles on “substantive NEPA.” See Richard S.
Arnold, The Substantive Right to Environmental Quality under the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act, 3 ENVTL. L. REP. 50028 (1973); see also ROGERS, supra note 9, at 896 (arguing that sec-
tion 101(b) “could provide a vast body of federal case law defining the right to a healthful envi-
ronment in terms comparable to common law nuisance”).
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This was not a failure of wordsmithing on the part of the Con-
gress.  It was a failure to appreciate the impossibility of saying some-
thing as general as “Be Environmental!” to the federal establishment
as a whole and expecting it to happen, or to be enforced when it did
not happen.  So, of course NEPA shrank to the rock-hard require-
ment of an environmental impact statement in section 102(2)(C).  It
was the one provision in the statute that unarguably provided law to
apply.25
The unfortunate truth is that NEPA could not have it both ways,
the aspirationally general and the enforceably specific.  Congress
would either have to have made those aspirations—e.g., to “achieve a
balance between population and resource use which will permit high
standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities”26 (which is
almost a contradiction in terms)—more clear, or it would have to
have developed some mechanism more powerful than “giv[ing] ap-
propriate consideration”27 to environmental impacts to implement
those aspirations.  In fact, given the generality of its language and the
compromises made in its enactment, NEPA is extremely lucky to
have had any impact on federal decision-making at all.  At another
time, and almost certainly today, this statute would have been deliv-
ered stillborn.  It was brought to life by two great coincidences in the
law.
The first was Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic
Energy Commission.28  Local residents had challenged the licensing of
a nuclear plant, and during the proceedings, the Commission dutifully
It is difficult, today, to separate the Court’s treatment of substantive review under
NEPA from its determined hostility to any application of NEPA. See infra text accompanying
note 49 and sources cited.  Setting aside the Court’s obvious indigestion over NEPA, however,
one cannot easily glean from the standards of section 101(b) the precision that would allow a
reviewing court to determine whether, in a given case, an agency proposal had violated the law.
But see supra note 20.
25. NEPA, of course, is not the only statute to shrink from its intended scope.  The reduc-
tion of all environmental law to bare-bones minima is a phenomenon this author has called the
Fifty Percent Principle (“nothing in environmental law is more than fifty percent”), which we
can see, for example, in the gap between the “zero discharge” goal of the Clean Water Act and
the current rate of pollution discharge in this country. See Oliver A. Houck, Are Humans Part of
Ecosystems? 28 ENVTL. L. 1, 12 (1998).  Some statutes like the Multiple Use Sustained Yield
Act,  16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994) (outlining the purpose of multiple-use natural resources plan-
ning), contained the highest of aspirations but so little “law to apply” that they have had virtu-
ally no effect on federal decision-making. See Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the
Public Lands: Why Multiple Use Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405 (1994).
26. NEPA § 101(b)(5), 42 U.S.C.§ 4331(b)(5) (1994).
27. See id. at § 4332(B).
28. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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promulgated rules to comply with the brand new environmental stat-
ute, i.e., NEPA.  The Commission was not stonewalling NEPA; un-
like the stance of other federal agencies,29 the Commission would ap-
ply NEPA to ongoing proceedings and would open its review process
to all environmental considerations brought forward by the public.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs appealed the rules.  An initial, remarkable as-
pect of Calvert Cliffs is that plaintiffs were able to raise NEPA at all.
Here was a statute without a citizen suit provision.  Indeed, a provi-
sion assuring every citizen a “right” to a clean environment had been
deleted in the House-Senate conference out of fear that it would lead
to legal claims.30  Yet, here were ordinary citizens claiming violations
of NEPA.  At the benches of many judges of the time, and in front of
still more judges of today, these plaintiffs would have been sent
packing under any of several doctrines including “standing,”31 “ripe-
ness,”32 or the absence of a “private right of action.”33  Instead, how-
ever, they came before Judge Skelly Wright, a veteran of the civil
rights struggle in Louisiana and no stranger to government excuses,
obstruction, and delay.34  NEPA set standards that were to be “rigor-
29. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for example, took the early position that NEPA
did not apply to several hundred on-going water resources construction projects. See, e.g., Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng’s, 2 ERC 1173 (D.D.C. 1971) (rejecting government
argument that NEPA did not apply to previously authorized projects).
30. The original subsection 101(b), as passed by the Senate, provided, “Congress recog-
nizes that each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment;” this
provision was dropped in favor of the current 101(c), providing no such “right.” See “Statement
of the Managers on the Part of the House,” Conf. Rep., 1156 CONG. REC. 39702 app. (daily ed.
Dec. 17, 1969). See also RICHARD LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT:
NEPA AND ITS ALTERNATIVE 27 (1976).
31. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1997).
32. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
33. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981).
34. See Michael S. Bernick, The Unusual Odyssey of J. Skelly Wright, 7 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 971 (1980) (describing Judge Wright’s de-segregation decisions in Louisiana in the face of
entrenched, government-wide resistance and intense public reaction).  Denounced as “Judas
Scalawag Wright” and hung in effigy on numerous occasions, Wright became a focus of citizens’
anger.  A drive was started to impeach him for usurpation of legislative power.  The legislature
overwhelmingly voted to condemn his “disregard of the sovereignty of the state,” and when a
coffin bearing a coffee-colored doll named “smelly Wright” was carried through the state capi-
tol, nearly all of the legislators stood up and cheered. See id. at 972.  Wright was also the victim
of threatening letters and telephone calls—he was even treated to the spectacle of a burning
cross on his front lawn. See id. at 986.  In 1961, two vacancies occurred on the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit; however, Wright was passed over for both positions, the official explana-
tion being that Senate approval would not be forthcoming in light of strong opposition from
Louisiana Senators Allen Ellender and Russell Long. See id. at 990.  Finally, “late in 1961, a va-
cancy opened on the District of Columbia Circuit.  The Southern senators saw this as a way to
get Wright out of the South . . . .” Id. at 991.  This would be a move with significant unintended
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ously enforced” by reviewing courts,35 Judge Wright would write,
whose “duty,” he continued, was “to see that important legislative
purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdi-
rected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.”36  Calvert
Cliffs set the precedent, and a very high standard, for judicial review.
Without that, nothing in NEPA would have followed.
Having found review, Judge Wright then wrote a treatise on
NEPA.  He did not change the statute.  He simply rewrote it with as
much law to apply as he could find.  The opinion opens not with the
facts of the case nor the particular issues raised by the plaintiffs, but
rather, with a declaration of the importance of this new statute and an
interpretation of its provisions.37  Dr. Caldwell, Senator Jackson, and
the entire Senate Committee would have been hard pressed to write a
stronger, more explicit statement.  Indeed, had they done so, it is
quite possible that NEPA would never have been enacted.38  Turning
at last to the merits, Judge Wright flayed the Atomic Energy Com-
mission with language (e.g., its “crabbed interpretation of NEPA
makes a mockery of the Act;”39 the statute provided no “escape hatch
for foot-dragging agencies”40) that has acted as a goad to government
and a guide to reviewing courts ever since.41
consequences for public and administrative law. See David Pike, The DC Super Circuit, NAT’L
L. J., at 1, 10 (Mar. 30, 1981) (noting that the D.C. Circuit moved to “the forefront of courts
striking out boldly in behalf of regulation for the public interest”).
35. See Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
36. Id. at 1111.
37. The opinion begins with the self-creating prophesy:
These cases are only the beginning of what promises to become a flood of new litiga-
tion—litigation seeking judicial assistance in protecting our natural environment.  Sev-
eral recently enacted statutes attest to the commitment of the Government to control,
at long last, the destructive engine of material ‘progress’.
Id.
38. As one Senate staff member was quoted to have declared:
If we had waited another year, we would have developed legislation which wasn’t so
drastic in terms of program effect.  If Congress had appreciated what the law would do,
it would not have passed.  They would have seen it was screwing public works . . . .
The timing of the bill complicated the way it worked.  Had it passed a year earlier or
later, things would have been far different.  If Congress had known what it was doing,
it would not have passed the law.
LIROFF, supra note 30, at 35.
39. See Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1117.
40. Id. at 1114.
41. Calvert Cliffs has gone on to become what must be the most oft-cited opinion in envi-
ronmental law.  As of January 2000, a search of Westlaw found Calvert Cliffs cited in 436 re-
ported decisions.
HOUCK_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 04/17/01  12:45 PM
184 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 11:173
The second watershed event in NEPA was its subsequent re-
write as regulations, this time by the President’s Council on Environ-
mental Quality.  The Council, a body created by Congress without
any significant statutory powers and with only the slender tasks of
conducting studies and advising the President on environmental mat-
ters,42 had been taking the initiative to issue “guidelines” on points of
NEPA law to other federal agencies—over which it held absolutely
no authority—in response to the case victories that citizen suits had
been wresting from the courts.43  These guidelines, however, had little
more legal force or effect than suggestions.  Then in 1978, during the
brief term of the only President since 1969 to avow himself an envi-
ronmentalist, the Council received an executive order empowering it
to issue NEPA regulations,44 and it proceeded to do so.45  Regulations
are law, and agencies are as bound to comply with them as they are
with acts of Congress.46  The Council’s NEPA regulations were as pre-
scriptive and detailed as the statute was opaque.  They milked every
possible obligation out of NEPA and its accompanying—and by that
time, somewhat conflicting—case law.  They spelled out what federal
agencies had to do, obligation by obligation, as far as the statute
would permit—and some would say beyond.47  These regulations be-
came the bible for the federal establishment and for reviewing courts.
They became NEPA.
For these reasons, it is either a little disingenuous or a little naive
for The National Environmental Policy Act, An Agenda for the Future
to complain of NEPA’s reduction-to-its-minima at the hands of envi-
ronmental lawyers.  As any first-time reader of this statute can attest,
it is anything but self-evident.  The drafters of NEPA were fortunate
that their statute went anywhere at all, much less that it has gone so
42. See NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1994).  The Council’s eight statutory responsibilities re-
late exclusively to studies and advice to the President.
43. See Richard Liroff, The Council on Environmental Quality, 3 ENVTL. L. REP. 50,051
(1973).
44. See Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977).
45. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (2001).
46. While the binding legal effect of the Council’s regulations on other federal agencies has
been questioned, see ROGERS, supra note 9, at 820, it is without question that the regulations
receive high deference from reviewing courts.  Furthermore, all federal agencies, pursuant to
the Council’s regulations, have issued their own regulations implementing NEPA, to which they
are unarguably bound. See Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1971) (pronouncing
an agency to be bound by its regulations).
47. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1999) (treatment of cumulative impacts in the regulations,
including “reasonably foreseeable future actions”) with Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410
n.20 (1976) (rejecting the need to include “contemplated” projects).
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far.  NEPA was saved from anonymity and an early death by a ex-
traordinary opinion by the District of Columbia Circuit, followed by
other far-sighted opinions, followed by a remarkably strong set of
regulations, that, collectively, did what Congress could not or would
not do.  To have expected more of the federal government, without
far more explicit statutory language, is simply not-of-this-world.48
If NEPA was not written in a way to allow its lofty goals to be
enforced, however, Dr. Caldwell certainly has grounds to complain
that it was written with sufficient clarity of its purposes and proce-
dures to have had a greater impact on the federal establishment.  Fur-
ther, if the courts may take credit for establishing the rigor of this law,
they must also take the blame for subsequently diminishing it and
trimming its reach.  NEPA provokes fundamentally different points
of view.  There are those, and they clearly include the enacting Con-
gress and Judge Skelly Wright, who view NEPA as a planning de-
vice—a mechanism to open the federal doors, bring in the public, sort
out the alternatives, compare their impacts, and arrive at better deci-
sions.  There are others, and they clearly include the current Supreme
Court, who view NEPA more as a press release—a statement dis-
closing the impacts of decisions made.  The former see the process as
an instrument of positive change.  The latter see it as a threat to
agency decision-making and the status quo.  In the words of then-
professor, now-Justice Scalia, “does [the absence of judicial enforce-
ment of NEPA] mean that important legislative purposes, heralded in
the halls of Congress, are lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of
the federal bureaucracy?  Yes it does, and a good thing too!”49
It is hard to imagine a venue more hostile to NEPA—to any as-
pect of NEPA—than the Supreme Court has proven to be.  Of the
48. Indeed, it is hard to appreciate the degree of opposition and hostility NEPA faced
within the government, even to the clearly required impact statement process.  Consider the
following memorandum from the mining division of the U.S. Department of the Interior, com-
menting on an environmental impact review:
There is nothing in the report to support the statement, “Even with successful reclama-
tion, there might be a reduction in the productivity of the disturbed land.”  Certainly
there should be a better word then “disturbed” to describe land utilized and altered in
the production of coal.
When the Geological Survey has the lead in preparing environmental statements, in-
flammatory words such as disturbed, devastated, defiled, ravaged, gouged, scarred and
destroyed should not be used.  These are the words used by the Sierra Club, Friends of
the Earth, environmentalists, homosexuals, ecologists and other ideological eunuchs
opposed to developing mineral resources.
Memorandum from Andrew V. Bailey, Chief, Branch of Mining Operations, U.S. Geological
Survey to Environmental Section (Oct. 8, 1976) (on file with author).
49. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 881, 897 (1983).
HOUCK_FINAL_POSTPP.DOC 04/17/01  12:45 PM
186 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 11:173
twenty-two cases raising NEPA issues to the Court over the last thirty
years, none—not one—has been decided in a fashion that favored the
application of the statute to the facts at hand.50  The odds of 22-to-0
are not explainable by any random pattern known to science; chances
that lopsided would close the most rapacious casino in Biloxi, Missis-
sippi.  Nor are they explainable as correcting aberrations in the law,
as each case had been decided in an opposite fashion by at least one
lower federal court, all of which contain, one would assume, judges of
sound mind.
With the Supreme Court setting the tone, the federal judiciary
began slashing at even the procedural requirements of NEPA, cutting
fish loose, then cutting the lines.  One of the most critical elements of
the statute is its timing—the application of the impact assessment
process to transportation planning or forest management, for exam-
ple, as opposed to the later approval of highway segments (e.g., Inter-
state-95 from DeKalb Avenue to 10th Street in Washington, D.C.) or
to individual timber sales.  It is in the planning that the central NEPA
issues—alternatives and harm avoidance—are at issue.  Once the
plans are in place, the agencies busy themselves with defending them,
and NEPA review becomes simply an element of the defense.
One of the first agencies to slip the net was the Federal Highway
Administration, whose construction program caused such havoc in
the 1960s, particularly in urban areas, that it generated its own litera-
ture and litigation revolution.51  Starting in the 1970s, facing a spate of
new highway-related NEPA lawsuits,52 the federal courts began sev-
ering highway planning from NEPA, deferring the impact statement
process to the end-game.53  The Supreme Court reinforced this trend
in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, interpreting NEPA’s intentionally broad ap-
plication to federal “actions” as requiring discrete, site-specific pro-
50. See ROGERS, supra note 9, at 838.  Of these 22 cases, 12 have been decided exclusively
on NEPA issues and, of course, against the application of the statute. See David C. Shilton, Is
the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Explanations for a 12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL.
L. 551 (1990).  See also Antonio Rossmann, NEPA: Not So Well at Twenty, 20 ENVTL. L. REP.
10174 (1994).
51. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).  See also, e.g.,
ALBERT BENJAMIN KELLEY, THE PAVERS AND THE PAVED: THE REAL COST OF AMERICA’S
HIGHWAY PROGRAM (1971); HELEN LEAVITT, SUPERHIGHWAY—SUPERHOAX (1970); A. Q.
MOWBRY, ROAD TO RUIN (1969).
52. See LIROFF, supra note 30, at 35 & Table 2-2 (showing a rise in highway location law-
suits from single figures in the late 1960s to 17 in 1970, 27 in 1971 and 48 in 1972).
53. See Atlanta Coalition on the Transp. Crisis, Inc. v. Atlanta Reg’l Comm’n, 599 F.2d
1333 (5th Cir. 1979).
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posals.54  The result was the reduction of NEPA to smaller decisions,
largely faits-accompli, and the absence of NEPA when the major
deals are done.55  Nothing could be further from what Congress
thought—and said—it was doing.
The federal courts have continued to drop the ball on other as-
pects of NEPA, none of them fatal in and of themselves, yet cumula-
tively debilitating.  These decisions include:
• Restrictions on the consideration of alternative courses of ac-
tion,56 perhaps the single most important element in NEPA re-
view.  (If there are no alternatives to a proposed course of ac-
tion, why bother to review environmental impacts?)
• Termination of requirements for the mitigation of environ-
mental impacts,57 allowing blithe predictions of remedial ac-
tions that will, in reality, never take place.
• Failures to require the consideration of worst-case scenarios,58
allowing agencies to avoid conveying the really bad news.
• Questioning use of the process for legislative proposals,59 al-
though the first thing for which Congress stated the process
would be required was “proposals for legislation.”
54. See generally Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
55. In 1991, this author wrote the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality as
follows:
NEPA is missing the point.  It is producing lots of little statements on highway seg-
ments, timber sales, and other foregone conclusions; it isn’t even present, much less ef-
fective, when the major decisions on a national energy policy and a national transpor-
tation policy are made.  On the most pivotal development questions of our time,
NEPA comes in late in the fourth quarter, in time to help tidy up.
Mike, I have taught, researched and litigated this stuff for twenty years.  As I see it,
CEQ’s challenge is not, per your invitation, to make NEPA a “succinct review for a
single project.”  It is, rather, to make NEPA work for legislative proposals and for pro-
grams that all but conclusively determine what the subsequent projects will be.
Letter from Oliver A. Houck to Michael Deland, Chairman, President’s Council on Environ-
mental Quality (Feb. 19, 1991) (on file with author).
56. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 552-53 (1978)  (re-
jecting the need to consider energy conservation).  See also Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v.
Busey, 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (confining alternatives that must be considered to only
those meeting the main goals of the project).
57. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 353 (1989)  (endorsing
unaccepted, indeed not-even-proposed, local ordinances as sufficient mitigation “measures”
against the effects of a ski resort complex).
58. See id. at 354.  To be sure, the Council on Environmental Quality had weakened its
own worst-case regulation to obscure this requirement. Compare Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d
957, 969-75 (5th Cir. 1983) (interpreting the original worst-case regulation) with 40 CFR §
1502.22 (the revised worst-case regulation).
59. See Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 554 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (Randolph, J., concurring).
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• Exemption of government actions abroad,60 perpetuating the
same blindness in domestic policy that gave rise to NEPA.
The list goes on, and it can get depressing; Dr. Caldwell has rea-
son for his expression of despair.  NEPA did not have to be inter-
preted this way.  These are self-inflicted wounds.  These are court-
inflicted wounds by judges who would legislate another law, and who
show little respect for what Congress actually did or why.
Yet, they have not killed NEPA, nor can they.  Having whittled
the statute down to its irreducible bottom, there is little further dam-
age the courts can do short of finding it, or its enforcement, unconsti-
tutional.61  Nor is there much even the most hostile Congress can do,
for the same reasons, short of the politically costly step of repealing
the statute.  So, NEPA lives on in agency practice and in litigation
and—far more often—in the threat of litigation, nipping at the heels
of federal decision-making, surfacing greener alternatives, employing
its own cadre in every federal agency, and providing access for thou-
sands of individuals and community groups who count on the impact
statement process to give them notice and a fighting chance.  Dr.
Caldwell complains that NEPA is more than an Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.62  His observation is certainly correct, but it underesti-
mates the incredible, APA-like enfranchising power that this statute
has brought to the (one million? easily more) Americans who have
participated in the NEPA process over the past thirty years,63 as well
as the effect of this power on the federal establishment.  Agencies
know NEPA is out there, and they fear it.  And that has been salu-
tary.
So, yes, NEPA has not done what it was intended to do.  No
statute could have.  Many of the major, long-overdue, and extremely
difficult improvements in federal planning—improvements clearly as-
pired to in NEPA’s substantive provisions—are coming about
through other, more targeted laws with more specific requirements,
60. See NRDC v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(refusing to apply NEPA to export of nuclear materials to the Philippines).
61. Given the Court’s current disposition to revive Constitutional doctrines limiting the
reach of environmental statutes and their enforcement, see Oliver A. Houck, Environmental
Law and the General Welfare, 16 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1998), a similar approach to NEPA is
by no means inconceivable.
62. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC §§ 551-706 (1994).  The Act, inter alia, re-
quires “notice and comment” for informal (i.e., not adjudicatory) agency decisions allowing all
citizens to comment on federal proposals affecting, among other things, the environment. See id.
63. A single environmental impact statement to reintroduce endangered wolves to Yellow-
stone National Park and central Idaho drew 160,265 comments. See Sherry Devlin, Wolf Pro-
vokes Inadvertent Howlers, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 19, 1994.
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such as the Endangered Species Act64 and the section 404 (wetlands)
program of the Clean Water Act.65  Yet other federal laws have since
reached out to address the impacts of private actions on air, water,
soils, and nearly every conceivable medium.66  NEPA could not have
hoped to change a century of waste disposal practices, grazing de-
pendencies, deforestation, water use, and energy waste practices that
were largely unsustainable and largely supported by federal subsidies,
tax write-offs, and cornucopias of federal money the size of the high-
way construction program.67  Nor could NEPA have hoped to ensure
environmental priorities in the White House, the Congress, or an
agency run by an Ann Gorsuch or a James Watt.68
It is hard to imagine what single law could have done so and
what that law would say.  It is here that Dr. Caldwell’s book is at its
least compelling and offers little other than exhortations reminiscent
of section 101(b) (e.g., “enlarge public understanding of the need for
an effective environmental policy, which is also policy for people in
relation to the environment, and of the importance of NEPA princi-
ples for America’s future;”69 “ensure that the importance of NEPA
principles are present in the attention span of political party leaders
and the shapers of public opinion”70) and the long-debated proposal
64. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
65. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
66. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1994); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994); Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994) ; Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).  Each of these and other laws
impose highly specific requirements on industry and other private parties.
67. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS ON
WETLANDS (1994) (identifying 45 major federal subsidy programs encouraging the develop-
ment of wetland ecosystems).  For federal programs impacting other natural areas, see THE
GREEN SCISSORS CAMPAIGN OF CITIZENS UNITED TO TERMINATE SUBSIDIES, THE GREEN
SCISSORS REPORT: CUTTING WASTEFUL AND ENVIRONMENTALLY HARMFUL SPENDING AND
SUBSIDIES (1995) (on file with author); JOHN YOUNG ET AL., WELFARE FOR WASTE: HOW
FEDERAL TAXPAYER SUBSIDIES WASTE RESOURCES AND DISCOURAGE RECYCLING (1999);
ROLAND HWANG, MONEY DOWN THE PIPELINE: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN SUBSIDIES TO
THE OIL INDUSTRY (1995); FRIENDS OF THE  EARTH, POLLUTERS SAVE WHILE PEOPLE PAY:
EXPOSING 15 OF THE TAX CODE’S MOST UNFAIR TAX BREAKS (1995).
68. Ms. Gorsuch and Mr. Watt served respectively, as Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency and as Secretary of the Department of the Interior in the 1980s.  The envi-
ronmental officials of that era, appointed in large measure for their opposition to environmental
programs, left a record of assault on these laws unmatched before or since. See generally
JONATHAN LASH ET AL., A SEASON OF SPOILS:  THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION’S ATTACK ON
THE ENVIRONMENT (1984).
69. CALDWELL, supra note 7, at 155.
70. Id.
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for a constitutional amendment for environmental protection71—a
remedy that, of course, would trump a NEPA substantive policy alto-
gether.72
Lynton Caldwell’s The National Environmental Policy Act is a
lament.  At the end of the day, NEPA did not do all that it was in-
tended to do.  Its goals remain goals.  Its impact statement mechanism
has indeed become something of a catechism, an institutionalized rit-
ual in which the original words have lost their meaning.  The lament,
however, is as wrong as it is right, and Dr. Caldwell deserves more
credit for his original contribution to the statute than for this current
criticism of its performance.  Perhaps he does not realize it—perhaps
it is difficult for a non-lawyer to realize it, although Dr. Caldwell’s
advocacy for an “action-forcing” mechanism was lawyering at its
best—but no law can say “Be Environmental!” and make it stick.
Congress has to define the conduct, as it has in subsequent laws.
NEPA’s great contribution—and it is both magnificent in its
simplicity and deceptive in its power—is the environmental impact
statement.  It is not what the statement says that is important.  It is in
what comes before, in what agencies have to investigate and learn and
listen to, in what they have to fear from other agencies and from envi-
71. Id.  For a sampling and thoughtful assessment of articles on the subject of a Constitu-
tional amendment for environmental protection, see ROGERS, supra note 9, at 62-67 and
sources cited therein.
72. Once the Constitution were to declare a policy of environmental protection, that decla-
ration would, of course, trump statutory law.  Nevertheless, that declaration would be subject to
a multitude of interpretations by the Supreme Court, a prospect giving some observers pause.
See ROGERS, supra note 9, at 67.  At bottom, however, one finds the same difficulty in framing a
constitutional amendment that confronted Congress in enacting the substantive policies of
NEPA in 1969—the need to say something sufficiently general to be of wide application and
sufficiently specific to be capable of enforcement.  Even were it not enforceable as law, of
course a constitutional amendment might well carry a moral force that would strengthen the
interpretation of other environmental and public laws, particularly in the establishment of pro-
cedural rights such as standing to sue. See Rodger Schlickeisen, Protecting Biodiversity for Fu-
ture Generations An Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 181 (1994);
see also Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999)
(holding that the Montana Constitution disallows exceptions to state water quality anti-
degradation policy).  NEPA itself carried such force in its early years, and it boosted a pro-
environmental interpretation of other laws and programs. See Zabe v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th
Cir. 1970) (viewing NEPA as giving the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers a duty to protect wet-
lands and waters of the United States); Akers v. Resor, 339 F.Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn. 1972),
(viewing NEPA as revitalizing the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act).  Constitutions of other
countries contain environmental provisions, a few of which have been given similar force and
effect.  In the United States, however, these decisions have been made largely on the basis of
statutory law.  Indeed, the very success of statutory environmental law in the United States, be-
ginning with NEPA, has removed much of the urgency and momentum for a proposed constitu-
tional amendment.
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ronmental groups, the press, and reviewing courts, and in the every
day responses and accommodations that they have to make.  This was
blockbuster stuff in the United States circa 1969, and it remains very
difficult stuff in areas like genetic engineering, bio-prospecting, inter-
national lending, World Trade Organization commitments, and the
new horizon of year 2000.  The NEPA ideas of disclosure, public par-
ticipation, alternatives, and judicial review are blockbuster stuff as
well for the developed countries of Europe and are absolutely revolu-
tionary stuff for developing nations in Latin America and the Far
East and for those, like Croatia and Cuba, who are also signing on.  In
this one regard, this one huge regard, NEPA has been the largest en-
vironmental success in the world.
To the extent he can legitimately claim credit for it—and the evi-
dence is that he can—Lynton Caldwell should sit back and enjoy a
good stiff millennial drink.  Well done!  Following which, like the rest
of us who labor in this vineyard, he should come back out swinging,
because we will never save the environment with the one big blow he
longs for.  But we have to keep on swinging.
